Preconditions, not causes
This page is a claim about what was already true in a country before a local-currency stablecoin appeared in it. It is NOT a claim that any of it caused anything. The views are ordered by how strong the evidence is, and the strongest leads.
Transfer counts are for calendar 2025 and count only stablecoins denominated in that country's own currency. Raw row counts would inflate Brazil by about 2.8 times: half of this database's rows touch the zero address and are issuance rather than payment, and a further large share passes through issuer treasury and reserve wallets. Nine such wallets are excluded for one token and two for another, and the XRP Ledger is included as a tenth chain with its issuer playing the zero address's role.
The two issuer wallets belonging to nBRL are the weakest classification in that registry. They were identified from behaviour — one received the deployer mint, and the pair passed a round 400,000,000 between themselves — rather than from any disclosure. Including them changes Brazil's 2025 count by 20 rows out of four million, so nothing on this page turns on it, but the basis is stated because it could.
A country with no local-currency stablecoin carries a MEASURED ZERO, not a gap. Twenty-nine of the thirty-two do. That is the finding the lead view exists to show, and rendering it as an absent value would say 'unmeasured' where what is meant is 'none'.
Every on-chain count here is a floor on coverage and an upper bound on economic activity at the same time. A floor, because the ingestion's own block pointer runs ahead of the deepest block actually ingested on every chain. An upper bound, because the registry of issuer wallets covers two tokens out of eighteen, and unidentified issuer wallets would still be counted as economic flow.
The remittance bars do not share a vintage. Each country's value is its newest published year, and across the thirty-two those years run from 2016 to 2025. Every bar is therefore labelled with its own year rather than sitting under a single one asserted for all of them.
Account ownership is a SURVEY, run in waves in 2011, 2014, 2017, 2021 and 2024, and no country appears in every wave. Those observations are a set of vintages rather than a calendar, so each country is one dot labelled with its own survey year and nothing is joined into a line. Connecting a country's 2011 observation to its 2024 one would draw a thirteen-year trend through two measurements.
The claim that bank branches are thinning is made about branches only. ATMs per 100,000 adults RISE in Argentina and Mexico over the same window, so folding the two together would make the sentence false. Both indicators are published; only one carries the argument.
Grenada is excluded from the broad-money ranking and published in the artifact. Its figure is an order of magnitude beyond every other country and would compress the remaining thirty-one bars into the axis. Venezuela's newest observation is a decade older than everyone else's and its bar is labelled accordingly.
The map's geometry is Natural Earth at 1:50 million, which is public domain and needs no permission. The coarser 1:110 million tier was rejected because it drops seven of these thirty-three countries entirely, and all seven have data — a map rendering a fifth of its subjects as absent would be worse than no map. It is drawn on an equirectangular projection with a standard parallel at 11°30′ south, and Pacific island territories fall outside the frame and appear in the ranking instead.
A country the World Bank did not publish is hatched on the map, never given the ramp's lowest colour. Absence is not a low value, and a map that renders unmeasured as small is asserting a number nobody published.